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A	Discussion	of	Kretchmar’s	Elements	of	Competition		
Richard	Royce		
Introduction
In	 a	 recent	 journal	 Kretchmar	 [2014]	 attempted	 to	 apply	 and	 explore	 Husserl’s	
transcendental	 phenomenological	method	 in	 relation	 to	 clarifying,	 in	 the	 context	of	 sport	
particularly,	 “if	hard	and	 fast	claims	about	 the	nature	of	competition	were	even	possible”	
[2014,	 35].	 With	 respect	 to	 both	 method	 and	 results	 his	 conclusions	 were	 less	 than	
enthusiastic.	In	a	post-script	he	claimed	“I	confess	to	feeling,	even	at	this	point,	that	I	barely	
broached	 the	 subject”	 [2014,	 35]	 and	 as	 to	 methods,	 “There	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 degree	 of	
sterility	to	this	kind	of	analysis”	[ibid].	Despite	this	he	reports	as	findings	“the	more	essential	
competitive	wall	conditions”	[2014,	35]	even	if	there	is	additional	work	to	be	completed.	My	
concerns	here	have	a	different	ambition,	and	as	my	endnotes	indicate,	also	challenge	those	
who	share	some	conclusions	reached	by	Kretchmar.	My	focus	 is	solely	upon	the	results	of	
the	inquiry	with	respect	to	gaining	an	understanding	of	competition.	Perhaps	given	a	wider	
brief	I	would	share	Kretchmar’s	reluctance	to	fully	endorse	the	chosen	method	and	after	my	
inquiries	 might	 have	 found	 myself	 agreeing	 with	 him	 when	 he	 claimed,	 “so	 much	 more	
could	have	been	reflected	on.	So	many	more	variations	might	have	provided	additional	or	
even	contrary	illuminations”	[ibid].	It	is	then	no	criticism	of	Kretchmar’s	effort	when	I	claim	
below	to	unearth	some	of	these	‘contrary	illuminations’:	in	writing	later	I	have	the	benefit	to	
take	the	discussion	further.	On	the	assumption	then	that	the	method	used	was	appropriate	
and	the	analysis	on	the	right	 lines,	Kretchmar’s	conclusions	which	 I	now	consider	are	 that	
“the	 elimination	 of	 any	 one	 of	 these	 elements	 –	 plurality,	 comparison,	 normativity,	 or	
disputation	 –	 renders	 competition	 unintelligible”	 [2014,	 27]1.	 Each	 element	 will	 be	
elaborated	upon	in	turn	below.	I	show,	in	passing,	that	the	ground	is	well-trodden	and	that	
others	have	produced	comparable	findings.	It	would	indeed	be	strange	if	they	were	radically	
different.	 Less	 recently,	 however,	 alternative	 conceptions	 have	 been	 considered	 [e.g.	
Skultety	2011;	Royce	2013],	but	matters	remain	contentious	[Skultety	2015].				
Before	 examining	 closely	 the	 relation	 of	 these	 four	 elements	 to	 competition	 it	 is	
helpful	 to	 distinguish	 some	 uses	 of	 ‘competition’	 in	 order	 to	 clarify	 contexts	 for	 testing	
applications	of	them.	An	important	difference	is	that	between	reference	to	competition	as	
what	I	shall	call	an	institution,	and	when	we	use	‘competition’	to	refer	to	the	act	of	taking	
part	 in	 a	 competition.	 The	 institutional	 sense	 relates	 to	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 a	
competition	 including	 those	specifying	how	applicants	qualify	as	entrants;	 rules	 regulating	
behaviour	of	competitors;	conditions	governing	disqualification	and	award	of	any	prizes;	the	
basis	 on	 which	 winners	 and	 losers	 will	 be	 identified,	 and	 so	 on.	 When	 we	 refer	 to	
competition	 in	 this	 institutional	 sense	we	are	 referring	 to	what	may	be	written	down	and	
what	 precedes	 the	 competition	 getting	 under	 way.	 When	 we	 say	 that	 someone	 is	 in	 a	
competition	it	is	appropriate	to	be	asked	which	one,	and	indicating	the	institutional	details	is	
one	way	to	respond.		
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On	 other	 occasions,	 however,	 we	 remark	 that	 someone	 is	 [was	 or	 will	 be]	 in	
competition	with	another	and	in	this	use	one	thing	we	may	mean	is	that	she	is	[was	or	will	
be]	taking	part	in	a	competition.	Call	this,	for	want	of	a	better	label,	the	participatory	sense2.	
Supplying	 information	 contained	 by	 use	 of	 the	 institutional	 sense	 can	 clarify	 which	
competition	 someone	 is	 in:	 but	 it	 is	 not	 always	 available.	 For	example,	we	might	 refer	 to	
people	being	 in	competition	with	each	other	without	 there	being	any	clarified	and	agreed	
terms	and	conditions	of	a	competition.	Siblings	or	neighbours	might	see	themselves	and	be	
seen	to	be	 in	competition	with	each	other,	outside	of	any	terms	and	conditions	governing	
their	competitive	behaviour.	They	act	competitively	towards	the	other	in	selected,	evolving	
and	valued	ways.	So	people	can	be	 in	competition	 [participatory	sense]	against	each	other	
without	 being	 in	 a	 competition	 [institutional	 sense]	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 absence	 of	 the	
institutional	 sense	 of	 competition	 here	 is	 not	 because	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 their	
competing	are	not	written	down	but	could	be.	It	is	because	there	are	no	defined	conditions	
providing	 an	 agreed	 framework	 for	 their	 competing,	 with	 a	 clear	 start	 and	 conclusion,	
regulations	 delimiting	 the	 focus	 of	 application,	 rules	 specifying	 who	 may	 compete,	
clarification	on	disqualifications,	and	so	on.	The	participants	themselves	might	be	unaware	
of	 when	 they	 first	 began	 to	 act	 competitively	 or	 when	 the	 other	 did;	 how	 spheres	 of	
competitive	activity	arose	or	dissolved;	or	why	they	behave	in	the	ways	they	do	with	regard	
to	some	but	not	towards	all	others.	They	might	also	be	unaware	of	how	competitive	their	
behaviour	is	with	respect	to	each	other.		
The	first3	element	-	plurality	
With	 the	addition	of	a	 few	more	observations	 these	points	can	help	exploration	of	
the	 relation	 to	 competition	 itself	 of	 the	 elements	 Kretchmar	 discusses.	 Starting	 with	 the	
institutional	 sense	we	 can	 imagine	 a	 competition	 being	 set	 up.	 Terms	 and	 conditions	 are	
clarified	 and	 include	 rules	 governing	 entry	 to	 the	 competition.	 These	 latter	 require,	 for	
example,	 self-registration	 by	 those	 wishing	 to	 enter	 the	 competition	 and	 who	 are	 also	
members	 of	 a	 school,	 town,	 between	 certain	 ages,	 or	 of	 a	 particular	 sex,	 and	 so	 on.	 To	
permit	 entries	 the	 competition	 registration	 list	 is	 displayed	 in	 the	 school	 corridor,	 on	 the	
club	website,	 etc.	 Finally,	we	 should	 note	 that	 in	 discussing	 the	 four	 elements	 just	 listed	
Kretchmar	 uses	 the	 words	 ‘contest’	 and	 ‘competition’	 interchangeably:	 “…the	 nature	 of	
competition,	 agon,	 or	 contest,	 as	 it	 is	 variously	 identified”	 [2014,	 21].	 What,	 then,	 are	
consequences	of	 reference	to	 this	 institutional	 sense	of	competition,	 that	 is,	 to	being	 in	a	
competition,	 for	 Kretchmar’s	 claims	 concerning	 the	 elements?	 Consider	 first	 his	 claims	
about	the	element	of	plurality,	without	which	competition	is	said	to	become	unintelligible4.	
He	says	"…competition	is	grounded	in	plurality.	Competition,	in	other	words,	does	not	work	
in	 isolation	–	 that	 is,	 in	 the	absence	of	at	 least	 some	 identifiable	other”	 [2014,	23].	 Large	
numbers	 of	 competitors	 pose	 no	 theoretical	 problem	 for	 competition,	 but	with	 less	 than	
“two	 parties,	 two	 acts	 and	 two	 products,	 we	 lose	 competition”	 [2014,	 24].	 In	 short,	 “a	
contest	against	nobody	…makes	no	 sense”	 [Kretchmar	2014,	24].	But	 these	comments	do	
not	apply	to	the	institutional	sense	of	competition,	for	the	following	reason.	Competitions	in	
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the	 institutional	 sense	 have	 no	 entrants	 when	 first	 set	 up.	 Creating	 a	 competition	 must	
precede	entering	it.	Hence,	it	can	have	any	number	of	entrants	from	zero	to	the	maximum	
permitted.	Rules	might	state	that	the	competition	[institutional	sense]	will	be	declared	null	
and	void	unless	two	[or	any	stipulated	number	of]	entrants	 join,	but	need	not	specify	any	
minimum	number.	A	competition,	then,	might	remain	with	no	entrants,	or	attract	one	only.	
Because	 this	 is	 intelligible,	 claims	 to	 the	 contrary	 have	 weaknesses.	 Plurality	 is	 not	 a	
required	element	of	competition	in	the	sense	discussed	here.	
What	then	of	using	 ‘competition’	 to	refer	to	the	event	 itself	 in	operation,	 to	taking	
part	 in	 a	 competition,	 to	 being	 in	 competition	 in	 the	 participatory	 sense?	 Is	 plurality	 a	
requirement	 of	 competition	 here?	 Suppose,	 in	 the	 institutional	 sense	 of	 competition	
considered	 above,	 that	 by	 the	 time	 entrance	 to	 the	 competition	 closes	 it	 has	 only	 one	
entrant;	that	nothing	in	the	terms	and	conditions	specifies	a	minimum	number	of	entrants	
required;	 that	 winning	 the	 competition	 consists	 of	 more	 than	 merely	 entering	 it.	 The	
competition	organizers	are	not	going	to	award	first	place	in	the	running	event	to	someone	
who	can’t	run;	or	 in	the	pole	vault	to	someone	who	cannot	vault	with	a	pole.	So,	the	sole	
entrant	has	to	perform	the	event	to	win	it.	We	can	imagine	similar	requirements	for	winning	
the	pie-baking,	flower	arrangement,	discus,	and	other	competitions	where	taking	part	is	not	
dependent	 upon	 the	 ‘opposition’	 showing	 up.	No	 doubt	 the	 tennis	 competition	will	 have	
different	procedures.	But	what	this	demonstrates	is	that	it	is	not	just	the	institutional	sense	
of	competition	which	is	intelligible	without	a	plurality	of	entrants,	but	the	taking	part	sense	
which	 is	 too.	 Our	 sole	 athlete	 met	 the	 entry	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 the	 competition	
[institutional	sense]	and	completed	in	a	faster	time	or	with	a	higher	vault	the	task	identified	
distinguishing	this	competitive	event	from	any	others.	Of	course,	the	event	might	have	been	
the	last	heat	to	be	run	and	where	none	of	the	others	expected	to	take	part	appeared:	they	
had	been	injured	in	other	events.	Still	our	sole	participant,	but	in	this	case	not	sole	entrant	
in	 the	 heat	 would	 go	 through	 to	 the	 next	 round,	 perhaps	 to	 the	 final.	 He	 is	 in	 the	
competition,	 and	 his	 being	 the	 sole	 runner	 in	 his	 competitive	 heat,	 and	 its	 being	 a	
competition,	are	far	from	unintelligible.		
This	 situation	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 bizarre	 or	 ineffective.	 For	 example,	 as	 an	
incentive	huge	sums	of	money	might	be	available	as	the	prize	in	a	competition	to	best	solve	
a	 problem	 whose	 unattended	 continuation	 would	 have	 world-shattering	 consequences.	
Only	one	person	manages	to	produce	a	solution	despite	attempts	by	thousands	attracted	by	
the	prize	to	work	towards	finding	an	answer	to	the	problem.	The	latter,	however,	recognise	
their	inability	to	solve	it,	and	so	only	one	person	enters	the	competition.	She	wins	the	prize,	
the	competition	was	effective,	a	solution	found.	Certainly,	our	winner	might	have	been	the	
sole	entrant	and	not	won	the	prize:	more	was	needed	than	entering	and	taking	part	in	the	
competition.	 A	 solution	 to	 the	 world	 threat	 had	 to	 be	 submitted	 to	 satisfy	 a	 further	
condition	of	 the	 competition.	However,	 the	 sole	entrant	was	not	denied	 the	prize	on	 the	
grounds	 that	 no	one	 else	 registered	 for	 and	 took	part	 in	 the	 competition.	 That	would	be	
self-defeating	of	the	organisers.	Awarding	her	the	prize	recognises	that	she	alone	satisfied	
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conditions	governing	entry	to	the	competition	and	success	in	it.	Plurality,	therefore,	is	not	a	
requirement	of	the	intelligibility	of	either	of	the	two	senses	of	competition	discussed	here.	
Consider	 a	 further	 point	 and	 my	 reply	 to	 it.	 An	 objection	 is	 that	 while	 the	 prize	
winner	mentioned	above	entered	a	competition	she	did	not	compete	in	it,	on	the	grounds	
that	there	was	no	opposition,	or	as	it	is	sometimes	expressed,	‘no	competition’.	Against	this,	
first,	 competitions	 vary	and	with	 some	of	 them	no	entrants	 know	how	many	others	have	
also	entered,	but	such	lack	of	knowledge	need	not	influence	how	hard	they	try	to	win,	nor	
how	competitively	they	strive.	This	can	also	be	the	situation	when	there	is	only	one	entrant	
who	knows	she	is	the	only	one.	Second,	our	entrant	would	not	win	the	prize	on	the	grounds	
of	 being	 the	 sole	 entrant.	 In	 this	 example,	 at	 least	 a	 plausible	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	
advertised	had	to	be	submitted.	The	competitive	aspect	occurred	in	isolation	when	trying	to	
devise	a	solution	to	the	task.	 In	sport	one	can	 imagine	a	competition	 in	which	all	athletes	
have	to	run	the	same	set	distance	as	fast	as	they	can,	on	their	own,	without	knowing	how	
many	or	even	whether	any	others	are	in	the	same	competition,	and	what	their	results	are.	
This	is	still	an	institutional	competition	in	which	one	or	more	athletes	compete.	Third,	 in	a	
very	unevenly	matched	competition	where	one	entrant	 is	superior	 to	all	others	and	when	
we	might	say	‘there	is	no	competition’	for	him,	he	still	has	to	put	some	effort	to	winning	and	
compete	sufficiently	to	win.	Entrants	do	not	refrain	from	competing	when	they	are	exerting	
less	than	maximum	effort.	Runners	in	heats	are	often	seen	to	compete	enough	to	qualify	for	
the	final	without	pushing	themselves	to	the	limit.	
	 Suppose	 it	 is	 countered	 that	 Kretchmar’s	 discussion	 is	 intended	 to	 apply	 only	 to	 a	
sense	of	competition	which	he	equates	to	contesting,	and	that	this	latter	is	partly	defined	by	
the	plurality	of	its	participants.	In	several	places	and	in	more	than	one	article	he	implicitly	or	
explicitly	 indicates	 that	 he	 uses	 the	 words	 ‘contest’	 and	 ‘competition’	 and	 ‘agon’	
interchangeably5.	 But	 note	 too	 reasons	 to	 doubt	whether	 his	 practice	 of	 using	 the	 terms	
interchangeably	 requires	 them	 to	 relate	 only	 to	 the	 plurality	 he	 highlights.	 Early	 on	 he	
reminds	us	 [2014,	23-24]	 that	 “those	who	contest…try	 to	put	 two	or	more	 things	 side	by	
side…for	purposes	of	evaluating	their	similarities	and	differences”	and	the	environments	in	
question	may	be	debates,	bake-offs,	tractor	pulls,	and	essays.	His	starting	point	is	therefore	
to	establish	that	competition	requires	comparison	of	these	‘two	or	more	things’.	 It	 is	then	
not	difficult	for	him	to	move	us	to	the	next	step	and	“suggest	that	competition	is	grounded	
in	plurality”	 [2014,	 23],	 a	necessary	 condition	 for	making	a	 comparison.	But	 this	 is	 a	 step	
backwards.	Before	we	can	establish	that	comparison	is	needed,	we	must	check	that	plurality	
obtains,	or	 there	might	not	be	anything	to	compare	with	anything	else.	That	two	or	more	
things	are	being	 compared,	however,	 is	 insufficient	 to	establish	 the	 conclusion	Kretchmar	
wants	to	attain.	He	does	not	want	as	his	conclusion	that	competition	requires	a	plurality	of	
objects:	 what	 he	 wants	 is	 that	 there	 must	 be	 a	 plurality	 of	 competitors.	 Hence,	 when	 I	
arrange	a	number	of	my	baked	goods	 in	 the	village	home-cooking	competition	we	have	a	
plurality	 of	 pies	 and	 cakes	 submitted	 for	 comparison,	 but	 only	 one	 competitor	 –	me.	 He	
starts	 by	 discussing	 a	 comparison	 of	 objects	 [2014,	 23]	 before	 considering	 the	number	 of	
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golfers	competing	[2014,	24],	as	he	moves	to	do	when	discussing	plurality,	and	this	not	only	
reverses	the	order	needed	but	also	muddles	the	number	of	objects	of	comparison	with		the	
number	of	competitors	needed.	In	short,	from	the	fact	that	in	making	comparisons	we	need	
a	 number	 of	 things	 to	 compare	we	 should	 not	 conclude	 that	we	 also	 need	 a	 number	 of	
people	 to	make	 the	 comparisons.	 This	 is	what	 he	 implicitly	 does	 later	when	 summarising	
earlier	claims:		
Contesting	includes	a	disputation,	an	argument,	a	commitment	by	two	or	more	
parties	to	show	superiority	over	the	other(s)…	Without	a	bilateral	or	multilateral	
dispute,	there	can	be	no	contest	[2014,	26].	
	
	And	 if	we	are	to	assume	all	along	that	the	only	sense	of	competition	we	are	discussing	 is	
one	 where	 several	 people	 are	 involved	 as	 competitors,	 we	 don’t	 need	 arguments	 to	
establish	this:	we	simply	declare	our	assumption.	
The	second	element	-	comparison	
Given	competition	in	the	two	senses	outlined	here	[institutional	and	participatory]	is	
intelligible	without	requiring	the	element	of	plurality,	what	are	implications	for	the	element	
to	which	it	is	said	to	relate	closely,	namely	‘comparison’?	Recalling	the	interchangeability	of	
‘contest’	and	‘competition’,	note	what	Kretchmar	maintained:	“…contesting	acts,	if	nothing	
else,	require	comparison”	[2014,	23].	We	cannot	compare	one	thing,	simpliciter.	We	need	at	
least	 two	 to	 make	 a	 comparison.	 He	 maintains	 “…a	 contested	 comparison	 with	
nothing…makes	no	 sense”	 [Kretchmar	2014,	 24].	However,	 his	 insistence	here	 concerning	
comparison	as	an	element	is	brought	into	doubt	by	earlier	claims	when	he	stated	that	the	
contested	world	“is	one	 in	which	comparisons	can	be	made”	[p.	23,	my	emphasis]	and	he	
gives	examples	which	he	believes	“allow	us	to	juxtapose	one	thing	to	another	and	evaluate	
their	 differences”	 [p.	 23,	 again	 my	 emphasis].	 In	 competition	 are	 we	 required	 to	 make	
comparisons,	or	does	it	merely	permit	them	[on	some	occasions]	to	be	made?	If	the	claim	
relates	only	to	possibility,	then	failing	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunity	hardly	renders	
the	 context	 unintelligible	 as	 a	 competition.	 But	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	 his	 other	 claims,	
Kretchmar	 must	 be	 understood	 to	 mean	 that	 with	 competition,	 comparisons	 are	 always	
possible,	 because	 competition	 always	 involves	 plurality;	 and	 that	 in	 addition,	 we	 must	
compare	because	“contesting	acts…require	comparison”	[2014,	23].		
However,	 if	 the	 claim	 that	 competition	 requires	 plurality	 is	 defeated,	 then	will	 the	
conclusion	that	competition	requires	comparison	also	fall?	Where	there	is	only	one	entrant	
to	 a	 competition,	 and	 where	 only	 one	 entrant	 is	 submitting	 himself	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	
competition,	 we	 have	 no	 other	 entrant	 with	 whom	 he	must	 be	 compared.	 Suppose	 it	 is	
replied	that	our	one	entrant’s	achievement	in	competition	can	always	be	compared	to	the	
prior	achievements	of	another	in	the	same	activity,	whether	or	not	the	latter’s	results	were	
in	 a	 competition.	 In	 reply,	 that	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 defend	 the	 claim	 that	 comparison	 is	 a	
required	 element	 of	 competition,	 because	 our	 one	 entrant	 might	 have	 attempted	
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something	 not	 known	 to	 have	 been	 or	 not	 previously	 attempted	 by	 anyone,	 and	 hence	
where	there	is	no	direct	comparison	to	be	made.	Further,	the	cost	of	attempting	to	defend	
in	this	way	comparison	as	an	element	of	competition	is	to	deny	that	plurality	is	an	element.	
If	competition	requires	that	we	must	make	a	comparison	and	that	in	cases	of	a	sole	entrant	
to	a	 competition	 that	will	 be	with	 someone’s	effort	outside	of	 the	 competition,	 it	 implies	
competition	 can	 have	 one	 entrant	 /	 performer	 alone,	 and	 that	 plurality	 is	 not	 a	 required	
element	of	 competition.	While	 someone	performing	 later	 an	act	previously	performed	by	
many	others	might	have	as	an	aim	to	achieve	better	than	all	previous	efforts,	this	does	not	
require	us	to	classify	all	the	earlier	performers	as	being	in	a	competition,	or	that	all	previous	
performances	were	undertaken	competitively.		It	is	not	plausible	to	maintain	that	anyone’s	
later	achievements	undertaken	with	a	competitive	intention	require	us	to	re-classify	others’	
previous	 efforts	 at	 the	 same	 activity	 as	 attempts	 to	 set	 an	 unsurpassable	 standard	 of	
achievement	when	they	completed	their	performance	in,	for	example,	mundane	acts	such	
as	sweeping	the	floor	quickly.	Someone’s	sporting	achievement	might	be	hailed	as	the	best	
ever	when	compared	with	that	of	others	in	the	same	activity,	but	comparison	itself	does	not	
imply	any	of	them	were	competing	against	each	other,	in	a	competition,	or	for	a	prize.	
There	 are	 other	 difficulties	 with	 asserting	 comparison	 is	 required	 for	 competition,	
especially	 in	 the	 context	 that	 comparison	 can	 occur	 irrespective	 of	 whether	 there	 is	
competition.	 Conditions	 prior	 to	 events	 might	 be	 compared	 to	 ensure	 that	 in	 relevant	
respects	 they	 are	 the	 same,	 for	 example	 by	measuring	 tail	 wind	 speed	 before	 a	 running	
event.	 But	 comparisons	 of	 completed	 performances	 must	 follow	 performance	 itself,	
implying	at	least	one	important	aspect	of	comparison	can	occur	only	after	the	competition	
has	 finished.	At	 least	 this	 holds	 for	many	 simultaneous	 competition	 action	 sports	 such	 as	
running	events;	several	team	games;	swimming;	and	motor	racing.	In	what	sense	then	can	it	
be	maintained	that	comparison	is	a	condition	of	competition	rather	than	contingent	on	it?	Is	
it	 unintelligible	 to	 state	 that	 before,	 during	 and	 after	 competitive	 performances	 were	
completed	comparisons	were	not	made?	After	the	football	match,	everyone	was	silent	and	
hurried	off	home.	Must	 I	 state,	or	must	 the	 thought	enter	my	consciousness	after	playing	
tennis,	 ‘so	 you	 won’?	 Is	 this	 the	 sort	 of	 comparison	 which	 is	 said	 to	 be	 required	 by	
competition,	 and	 without	 which	 competition	 is	 said	 to	 be	 unintelligible?	 Or	 is	 it	 more	
plausible	 to	 imagine	 a	 scratch,	 time-regulated	 game	 where	 no	 one	 has	 kept	 score	
throughout	 the	match	 but	 all	 know	when	 it	 is	 over,	 and	 no	 comparisons	 are	made?	 Is	 it	
players,	officials,	spectators	or	a	combination	of	them	who	must	make	comparisons	in	order	
to	 elevate	 events	 into	 a	 competition?	 And	 if	 so,	 what	must	 be	 compared	 –	 individual	 or	
team	performance;	or	event	results;	or	use	of	skills;	or	of	game	tactics;	and	so	on?	Games	
such	 as	 soccer,	 tennis,	 hockey	 and	 cricket	 are	 competitive	 enterprises.	 But	we	 know	 this	
ahead	of	noting	whether	any	comparisons	are	made	between	players	or	teams	taking	part,	
or	 between	 points	 and	 scores	 achieved.	 If	 during	 play	 and	 the	 post-match	 scenario	 no	
comparisons	are	made,	we	do	not	retract	our	claim	that	a	competition	was	taking	place.	We	
do	 not	 await	 the	 first	 comparative	 thought	 or	 comment	 to	 have	 confirmed	 that	 we	 are	
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watching	a	competitive	event.	Someone	exclaiming	of	 two	grandmothers	knitting	 side-by-
side,	 each	 notorious	 for	 claiming	 she	 knits	 faster	 than	 the	 other,	 that	 one	 is	 progressing	
more	 rapidly	 does	 not	 transform	 the	 simultaneous	 practice	 of	 their	 hobbies	 into	 a	
competition.	So,	here	too,	comparison	is	simply	an	optional	activity	and	not	a	requirement	
[along	with	other	elements]	of	competition.	
Kretchmar’s	 insistence	 that	 competition	 is	 reciprocal,	 placing	 emphasis	 on	
competition	 against	 or	with	 others,	 overlooks	 the	 idea	 of	 competition	 as	 an	 attempt	 in	
some	circumstances	to	achieve	a	goal	independent	of	others.	Certainly	the	sole	competitor	
must	 satisfy	 conditions	 of	 the	 competition	 and	 may	 compete	 for	 the	 prize,	 or	 to	
demonstrate	better	personal	performance.
The	third	element	-	normativity						
The	third	element	 is	 the	normative	one,	 referred	to	as	evaluative	comparison,	and	
hence	 links	 to	 the	 second	element.	Kretchmar	 summarises	 this	 referring	 to	 “…contests	as	
evaluated	comparisons…Competition,	 in	short,	becomes	unthinkable	 in	the	absence	of	the	
normative	element”	[2014,	25]6.	In	sport,	competition	may	produce	winners	and	losers,	and	
even	if	draws	result,	this	seems	consistent	with	the	presupposition	of	a	normative	element,	
that	 is,	of	contestants	being	compared	with	respect	to	their	relative	quality	 in	the	activity.	
Judgements	here	are	said	to	relate	to	what	is	better	or	worse;	superior	or	inferior;	stronger	
or	weaker7.	But	what	might	more	detailed	analysis	reveal?	Precisely	what	is	being	claimed	
by	stating	competition	must	have	a	normative	element?		
Kretchmar’s	position	 is	 that	 “Competitive	 comparisons…require...	 judgments	 about	
relative	worth”	[2014,	25].	The	defence	given	to	this	position	is	brief	and	limited,	however.	
We	are	told	that	without	it	contests	would	make	no	sense.	Kretchmar	[ibid]	even	claims	that	
“philosophic	 debates	 would	 be	 reduced	 to	 simple	 conversations”	 without	 evaluative	
comparisons	 of	 ideas,	 logic,	 and	 evidence.	 Given	 the	 context	 in	which	 he	 uses	 this	 as	 an	
example,	 he	 assumes	 the	 debates,	 and	 philosophic	 discussion	 itself,	 are	 competitive	
enterprises	rather	than	exploratory	and	investigatory	ones.	First,	leaving	aside	doubts	above	
about	whether	any	comparisons	at	all	are	required	in	competition	[and	I	have	argued	they	
are	 not],	 what	 can	 be	 said	 about	 evaluative	 as	 distinct	 from	 descriptive	 comparisons?	
Kretchmar’s	 test	 of	 intelligibility	 is	 not	met	 in	 examples	 of	 competition	where	descriptive	
differences	suffice	to	identify	winners	and	losers.	A	competition	to	grow	the	longest	carrot,	
the	 heaviest	 squash,	 the	 largest	 beetroot,	 or	 the	 biggest	 bunch	 of	 grapes	 is,	 whatever	
shortcomings	 one	 might	 attribute	 to	 such	 an	 enterprise,	 perfectly	 intelligible.	 Targets	 in	
each	 case	 can	be	provided	 in	 clear,	measurable,	 descriptive	 terms.	Moreover,	 there	 is	 no	
obligation	 to	 equate	 the	 biggest	 dimensions	 with	 best	 quality	 food,	 nor	 to	 believe	 the	
relative	worth	of	each	class	of	vegetable	is	related	to	its	size.	Taste,	freshness,	appearance	
and	nutritional	content	are	all	contenders	for	quality.		
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Elsewhere	Kretchmar	elaborated	with	“sport	is	structured	to	produce	a	comparison,	
a	ranking,	a	‘better	than’	and	‘worse	than’	kind	of	conclusion”,	[2012,	104]	but	he	also	noted	
a	paradox	 too	when	adding	 “Those	who	are	more	 skilled	or	 virtuous	 should	also	perform	
better.	Those	who	have	 lesser	 capabilities	 should	perform	worse.	But	 in	 sport,	 that	 is	not	
always	the	way	things	turn	out”	[2012,	110].	Hence	there	is	acknowledgement	that	we	can	
recognise	a	winner	and	losers	without	respectively	identifying	them	as	superior	and	inferior	
sportspersons.	Assignation	of	the	winning	and	losing	position	following	a	sport	competition	
is	a	descriptive	act:	not	an	evaluative	one8.	We	are	not	constrained	by	reasons	of	necessity	
to	 draw	 from	 the	 score-line	 of	 the	 match	 any	 evaluative	 conclusions	 concerning	
comparisons	of	players’	abilities	or	 levels	of	performance,	and	 the	 ‘is-ought’	distinction,	 if	
there	 is	 one	 [see,	 for	 example	 Hudson,	 1969,	 but	 also	 much	 	 later	 debate,	 for	 example	
Hindriks,	 2012]	 gives	 support	 to	 this.	 Competition	 is	 thus	 eminently	 ‘thinkable’	 in	 the	
absence	of	any	normative	element,	as	those	following	the	argument	here	can	testify.	
The	 availability	 of	 objective	 criteria	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 sport	 competition	
outcomes	rest	is	equally	apparent.	Competitions	reveal	who	can	run	fastest,	throw	farthest,	
jump	 highest,	 and	 score	 more	 points,	 goals	 and	 runs.	 Those	 who	 do	 are	 the	 winners.	
Comparisons	 here	 too	 are	 with	 descriptive	 data.	 A	 further	 step	 is	 needed	 if	 we	 want	 to	
equate	‘more’,	 ‘faster’,	or	‘further’	with	‘better’.	The	idea	that	such	competitions	make	no	
sense	when	 devoid	 of	 evaluative	 comparisons	 is	 thus	 readily	 refuted.	 But	 in	 Kretchmar’s	
claims	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 discern	 a	 different	 thesis	 which	 emphasises	 not	 assessment	 by	
outcome	but	evaluation	of	process.	Two	examples	illustrate	this.	Concerning	a	competitive	
chess	match	the	issue	is	presented	as	“which	set	of	moves	is	more	successful	in	terms	of	the	
purposes	and	requirements	of	the	game”,	while	in	pie	baking	contests	the	measure	is	said	to	
be	the	culinary	skills	[2014,	25].	However,	the	set	of	chess	moves	and	the	culinary	skills	are	
no	more	 than	means	 to	 ends,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 latter	which	 are	 typically	 taken	 as	 criteria	 for	
victory	in	the	respective	competitions.	One	can	devise	competitions	where	typical	means	to	
other	ends	are	judged	independently	of	the	ends	they	customarily	attain,	or	even	before	the	
usual	ends	are	attained.	Perhaps	 running	on	an	athletics	 track	one	hundred	metres	 faster	
than	others,	and	not	on	a	football	or	rugby	pitch	where	it	would	be	useful,	 is	an	example.	
But	then,	out	of	the	game	and	in	a	different	competition	it	is	no	longer	a	means	to	another	
end,	but	in	need	itself	of	criteria	for	judging	victory.	Similarly,	while	some	moves	in	chess	are	
better	 than	 others	 with	 respect	 to	 achieving	 a	 win,	 the	 competition	 is	 decided	 by	 the	
objective	 state	 of	 affairs,	 the	 checkmate,	 irrespective	 of	 which	 legitimate	 means	 are	
employed	to	attain	 it.	 In	any	case,	 in	sports	the	match	or	event	result	given	 in	descriptive	
terms	is	invariably	a	good	indication	of	more	successful	means	to	achieving	the	result.	The	
numerical	[non-evaluative]	data	are	decisive.	Thus	competition	is	highly	intelligible	without	
making	evaluative	comparisons,	and	as	argued	earlier,	without	making	any	comparisons	at	
all9.	
Against	these	arguments	can	it	be	contended	that	too	much	has	been	read	into	the	
concept	of	normativity	when	it	is	identified	as	an	element	of	competition?	Perhaps	all	that	is	
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meant	 is	 that	whichever	 test	 is	 set	 in	 the	 competition	 should	be	 seen	 as	 the	 standard	of	
quality.	Where	the	winner	will	be	the	person	who	runs	the	distance	the	fastest,	fast	running	
is	 taken	 to	 be	 better,	 the	 fastest	 runner	 to	 be	 superior,	 and	 speed	 of	 running	 judged	 as	
meritorious.	Hence	when	after	the	event	we	rank	the	runners	in	their	order	of	finishing,	we	
ipso	 facto	 rank	 their	 relative	worth	 as	 runners	 over	 the	 distance	 run.	 If	 this	were	 so	 the	
response	 faces	 the	 following	 difficulties.	 First,	 what	 we	 compare	 is	 still	 something	
descriptive	in	origin:	the	times	taken,	the	distances	thrown,	the	heights	jumped.	We	cannot	
independently	of	these	descriptive	comparisons	make	the	claimed	evaluative	comparisons.	
So	 far	 it	 might	 appear	 Kretchmar	 [2014,	 25]	 would	 agree:	 “while	 competition	 requires	
comparison	 and	 assumes	 a	 descriptive	 identification	 of	 the	 things	 to	 be	 compared,	 it	
requires	more.”	But	closer	inspection	reveals	that	for	him	‘descriptive	identification’	relates	
to	clarifying	differences	between	disparate	entities	such	as	a	chair	and	a	sunset;	football	and	
basketball;	 sweet	 and	 sour	 desserts.	 Such	 comparisons	 are	 what	 he	means	 by	 simple	 or	
descriptive	 ones.	 He	 seems	 to	 assume	 that	 in	 some	 way	 competition	 transforms	 a	
descriptive	 comparison	 into	 an	 evaluative	 one.	Of	 these	 athletes	 some	have	 fair	 hair	 and	
others	dark;	some	are	over	six	feet	tall	but	2	are	not;	one	is	wearing	a	yellow	T-shirt	[and	so	
on	–	descriptive	comparisons].	But	if	we	state	this	runner	ran	in	under	9.3	seconds	whereas	
another	 did	 it	 in	 9.2	 seconds;	 she	 jumped	 eighteen	 feet	 and	 the	 other	 one	 another	 six	
inches,	and	so	on,	we	are	making	evaluative	comparisons.	If	so	presumably	we	could	reverse	
the	 categorisation	 of	 criteria	 of	 comparison	 by	 correctly	 point	 out	 that	 the	 running	 had	
nothing	 to	do	with	 it.	 In	 fact,	 the	athlete	who	 finished	 fourth	won	 the	competition	which	
was	about	appearing	in	the	most	brightly	coloured	T-shirt.	Our	identification	of	this	runner	
appearing	in	yellow	is	now	our	‘evaluative	comparison’:	not	of	who	ran	the	distance	in	the	
shortest	 time	 [a	 simple	 description].	 A	 question	 now	 is	 how	 this	 transformation	 has	
occurred,	for	nothing	descriptive	has	changed	whether	the	competition	is	about	running	or	
about	T-shirts.	 Some	competitions	 in	 sport	or	elsewhere	embody	evaluative	 standards	 [of	
beauty,	grace,	or	charm],	but	many	are	decided	by	a	basic	counting	or	measurement,	and	
hence	normative	comparisons	are	not	a	feature	of	all,	and	competition	as	such	 intelligible	
without	them.	Certainly	those	who	see	no	point	in,	for	example,	a	game	of	soccer,	and	value	
neither	 its	 ends	 nor	 the	 skills	 demonstrated	 in	 means	 to	 achieve	 them,	 nevertheless	
acknowledge	 such	matches	as	 competition.	Competition	 is	 intelligible	 as	 a	notion	 to	both	
those	denying	and	to	those	recognising	the	supposed	normative	element	of	it10.	
The	fourth	element	–	disputation	
In	 his	 attempt	 to	 search	 for	 elements	 which	 capture	 “all	 the	 central	 features	 of	
competition”	 [2014,	 25,	 my	 emphasis]	 Kretchmar	 next	 explores	 the	 addition	 of	 contests	
being	disputes.	In	a	first	attempt	he	[2014,	26]	writes,	“Contesting	includes	a	disputation,	an	
argument,	 a	 commitment	 by	 two	or	more	 parties	 to	 show	 superiority	 over	 the	 other[s]”.	
Without	disputation,	people	could	make	evaluative	comparisons	of	athletes’	performances,	
suggesting	 who	 the	 better	 player	 is,	 but	 do	 so	 outside	 of	 a	 contest.	 Even	 were	 the	
evaluations	 to	 take	 place	 by	 players	 during	 a	 match,	 Kretchmar	 produces	 an	 example	
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designed	to	be	rejected	as	a	case	of	competition.	He	asks	us	to	imagine	a	very	able	chess-
playing	mother	attempting	to	teach	her	child	as	they	play	each	other.	She	does	not	play	to	
show	superiority	over	her	daughter:	she	wants	to	assist	her	in	making	better	chess	moves,	
and	does	 so	 following	evaluations	during	 the	child’s	play.	The	child	wants	 to	win,	but	 the	
mother’s	motivation	is	to	help	and	not	to	show	superiority	over	her	daughter.	Hence,	when	
“This	 very	 commitment	 is	 missing	 in	 the	 mother’s	 approach	 to	 playing	 chess	 with	 her	
daughter”	 [2014,	 26]	 it	 is	 the	 mother’s	 intentions	 which	 prevent	 a	 case	 of	 competition	
because	they	“lack	some	element	that	is	essential	to	competition”	[ibid.]	It	is	said	to	be	the	
fourth,	 disputation	 element	which	 is	missing	when	 “mother	 and	daughter	 are	 involved	 in	
two	different	projects	–	one	pedagogical,	the	other	competitive”	[2014,	ibid.].		
However,	 there	 is	 not	 total	 clarity	 here,	 which	 can	 be	 seen	 when	 precision	 is	
requested.	 Is	 the	 fourth	 element	 required	 for	 competition	 a	 particular	 dispute	 between	
participants;	or	is	it	that	all	participants	must	share	the	same	[conflicting]	commitment11	to	
show	superiority?	Would	competition	obtain	if	no	participant	has	disputed12	with	the	others	
who	 is	 superior13,	 but	 all	 had	 entered	 an	 event	 committed	 to	 showing	 superiority	 with	
respect	 to	 the	others?	Such	a	possibility	might	obtain,	 for	example,	 in	an	athletics	 race	at	
school	 with	 pupils	 assigned	 by	 teachers	 to	 a	 particular	 event,	 and	 no	 dispute	 previously	
occurring	among	the	pupils,	all	of	whom	are	determined	to	come	first	in	the	race.	In	other	
words,	 are	 there	 three	 alternatives	 governing	 application	 of	 the	 fourth	 element,	 namely	
dispute,	 argument	 or	 commitment:	 or	 did	 Kretchmar	 intend	 three	 ways	 to	 express	 one	
criterion	here?	If	on	its	own,	‘commitment	to	show	superiority’	is	sufficient,	then	dispute	is	
not	needed,	at	 least	not	in	the	sense	that	it	 is	knowledge	shared	among	participants.	 If	all	
participants	 had	 independently	 and	 secretly	 informed	 a	 third	 party	 of	 their	 intention	 to	
show	superiority	we	might	still	doubt	this	is	a	dispute.	We	can	regard	it	as	a	case	of	holding	
conflicting	intentions.	
But	 suppose	 ‘dispute’	 is	 needed	 as	 a	 condition,	 and	 references	 to	 argument	 and	
commitment	are	no	more	than	alternative	ways	of	expressing	it.	How	then	should	dispute	
be	 understood?	 One	 account	 is	 that	 dispute	 occurs	 when	 “competitors	 lay	 claim	 to	 an	
outcome	that	only	one	of	them	will	be	able	to	possess”	[2014,	27].	Because	in	some	events	
a	draw,	tie,	or	shared	victory	is	possible,	these	must	be	excluded	from	what	competitors	are	
laying	claim	to.	What	all	must	contest	is	undisputed	and	unshared	victory.	But	this	poses	a	
problem	 for	 the	 account	 because	 it	 is	 common	 knowledge	 that	many	 contestants	 realise	
their	 chance	 of	 outright	 victory	 is	 non-existent.	 If,	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 their	 being	 in	 a	
competition,	 all	 participants	must	 lay	 claim	 to	 outright	 victory,	many	 events	we	 regularly	
regard	 as	 competitions	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 seen	 as	 such.	 Kretchmar	 is	 not	 attempting	 a	
revisionary	 account	 of	 competition.	 An	 endnote	 recognises	 that	 some	 competitors	 have	
“little	or	no	chance	to	show	superiority”	[2014,	36].	So	Kretchmar	in	an	apparent	attempt	to	
plug	 this	 gap	 re-words	 the	 condition	 for	 the	 disputation	 element	 as	 “contestation	makes	
sense	only	if	both	parties	‘argue’	for	success	in	the	direction	of	superiority”	[2014,	27].	Now	
effort	 is	 said	 to	 be	 aimed	 to	 “narrow	 the	 difference”	 [2014,	 36]	 between	 their	 previous	
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achievement	and	that	of	the	expected	and	eventual	winner.	Whether	dispute	occurs	when	
the	argument	for	success	in	the	direction	of	superiority	is	not	contested,	when	for	example	
the	 expected	 winner	 agrees	 that	 a	 contestant	 might	 well	 narrow	 the	 gap	 while	 still	 not	
winning,	is	not	made	clear.		
But	 the	 account	 is	 now	 seen	 to	 move	 from	 one	 difficulty	 to	 others.	 Where	 an	
overmatched	competitor	 is	aiming	to	narrow	the	difference	between	his	performance	and	
that	of	the	expected	winner,	it	is	unlikely	to	be	an	intent	shared	by	whoever	is	expected	to	
be	the	winner.	As	a	result,	while	the	 idea	of	 ‘narrowing	the	difference’	must	be	seen	as	a	
replacement	 intention	 for	 those	 with	 no	 hope	 of	 showing	 superiority,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
discussing	 the	 fourth	 element	 of	 competition	 it	 is	 an	 addition	 to	 the	 account	 we	 are	
considering.	 That	 is,	 Kretchmar’s	 condition	 for	 evaluative	 comparison	 relates	 to	 both	 the	
intent	to	show	superiority	and	to	narrowing	the	gap.	But	a	conclusion	now	is	that	such	so-
called	 competitors	 are	 “involved	 in	 two	different	 projects”;	 one	 competitor	 tries	 to	 show	
superiority,	 the	 other	 to	 narrow	 the	 gap.	 As	 a	 result,	 both	 ‘competitors’	 can	 gain	 their	
intended	outcome:	the	winner	to	show	superiority	by	winning,	and	the	runner-up	to	narrow	
the	gap	between	her	result	and	that	of	the	winner.	Therefore	the	‘dispute’	seems	to	have	
been	removed.	There	is	no	one	cherished	outcome	which	only	one	‘competitor’	will	be	able	
to	possess.	And	 if	we	 reflect	on	Kretchmar’s	 chess	playing	 /	 teaching	example,	 it	 appears	
strange	 that	 he	 went	 on	 from	 that	 to	 modify	 his	 condition	 governing	 a	 dispute.	 This	 is	
because	we	 can	 attribute	 to	 the	 two	 chess	 players	 the	 diverse	 aims	 behind	 the	modified	
account.	Here	 though,	 it	 is	 the	mother	 [the	stronger	of	 the	two	players]	who	through	her	
teaching	wishes	to	‘narrow	the	gap’	between	her	chess-playing	ability	and	that	of	her	child,	
while	 the	 daughter	 [the	 weaker	 player],	 we	 are	 told,	 is	 playing	 to	 win.	 So	 Kretchmar’s	
rejection	of	the	mother-daughter	game	as	competition	is	still	on	good	grounds	whether	we	
use	his	stronger	 [commitment	to	show	superiority]	or	weaker	additional	 [trying	to	narrow	
the	 gap]	 condition	 of	 the	 disputation	 element.	 His	 initial	 account	 of	 the	 chess	 players	
instructed	 us	 to	 reject	 it	 as	 competition	 because	 players	 did	 not	 share	 commitment	 to	 a	
common	 outcome;	 his	 subsequent	modification	 permits	 players	 to	 hold	 commitments	 to	
different	outcomes,	and	hence	is	in	breach	of	his	own	conditions	for	identifying	a	dispute.	In	
his	own	words,	“Competition	is	no	longer	intelligible”	when	“the	bi-	or	multi-lateral	dispute	
over	superiority	has	been	removed	from	the	activity”	[2014,	27].	
Two	other	difficulties	arise	here.	First,	while	a	dispute	centred	on	who	is	superior	in	
an	 event	 is	 properly	 characterised	 as	 one	 involving	 an	 evaluative	 comparison,	 argument	
above	not	only	demonstrated	that	with	one	competitor	aiming	instead	to	narrow	the	gap	no	
dispute	arises,	but	also	that	the	replacement	intent	may	not		be	based	on	evaluation.	What	
the	 weaker	 competitor	 aims	 to	 achieve	 is	 often	 presented	 in	 descriptive	 terms.	 If	 there	
should	 be	 any	 dispute	 over	 whether	 he	 was	 successful,	 the	 matter	 is	 resolvable	 by	
inspecting	 after	 the	 event	whether	 the	 gap	 has	 been	 narrowed.	 This	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	
comparing	 times,	 scores,	 distances,	 strokes	 and	 the	 like.	Here,	 no	evaluations	need	arise.	
Introducing	 the	 ‘narrowing	 the	 gap’	 condition	 has	 therefore	 removed	 any	 evaluative	
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comparison	in	some	cases.	Second,	Kretchmar	modifies	the	earlier	claim	that	normativity	is	
an	 element	 of	 competition	when	 he	 concludes	 that	 “it	 is	 intended	 to	 produce	 normative	
evaluations	 of	 better	 and	 worse"	 [2014,	 27,	 my	 emphasis].	 So	 one	 question	 is	 whether	
normativity	is	essential	for	competition,	or	whether	it	is	sufficient	if	one	merely	intends	such	
an	 outcome	 even	 though	 in	 some	 circumstances	 it	 does	 not	 result.	 Further,	 can	 a	
competition	be	set	up	to	include	people	who	have	no	such	intention?	Are	‘competitions’	to	
exhibit	and	compare	vegetables	in	terms	of	their	size,	weight,	length	etc.,	and	award	prizes	
to	their	growers	on	the	basis	of	these	characteristics,	 improperly	called	competitions?	Are	
sports	 ‘competitions’	 which	 determine	 outcomes	 by	 means	 of	 descriptive	 features	 of	
performances	 properly	 categorised	 as	 competitions?	 If	 not,	 is	 Kretchmar	 mistaken	 in	 his	
claim	 to	 have	 identified	 four	 elements	 of	 competition,	 and	 do	 his	 conclusions	 imply	 a	
revision	to	our	language?	
We	 have	 seen	 then	 that	whether	 the	 intention	was	 to	 produce	 three	 grounds	 for	
identifying	another	element	of	competition	–	disputation,	argument,	commitment	to	show	
superiority	–	or	whether	these	are	intended	to	express	one	and	the	same	condition,	there	
must	 be	 doubt	 about	 success	 of	 the	 project.	 Further,	modifying	 the	 conditions	 governing	
dispute	to	include	‘narrowing	the	gap’	produces	additional	difficulties.	
Nothing	 above	 denies	 the	 psychological	 possibility	 that	 competition	 can	 involve	
several	competitors	who	compete	in	an	attempt	to	show	their	superiority	over	others,	but	it	
argues	against	the	strong	thesis	that	competition	is	unintelligible	unless	we	understand	it	as	
having	 elements	 of	 plurality,	 comparison,	 normativity	 and	 disputation,	 in	 the	 ways	
Kretchmar	 proposed.	 He	 began	 with	 his	 understanding	 of	 competition	 ‘from	 the	 natural	
standpoint’,	drawing	from	his	experiences	of	it,	and	it	clearly	contained	the	seeds	of	all	he	
proceeded	 to	 unwrap	 in	 subsequent	 paragraphs,	 notably	 that	 competitions	 “require	
comparison”;	from	contestants	who	“lay	claim	to	the	higher	position”;	for	“evaluating	their	
similarities	and	differences”;	 to	 “	 see	which	one	prevails”	 [2014,	23].	 So,	 all	 the	elements	
were	there	from	the	start.	
Conclusion	
The	claimed	elements	of	 competition	have	been	considered	 separately	 in	order	 to	
evaluate	 Kretchmar’s	 conclusion	 that	 “the	 elimination	 of	 any	 one	 of	 these	 elements	 –	
plurality,	 comparison,	 normativity,	 or	 disputation	 –	 renders	 competition	 unintelligible”	
[2014:27].	My	conclusion	is	that	not	only	is	competition	intelligible	without	reference	to	any	
one	of	the	four	elements	but	that	it	is	intelligible	without	reference	to	any	of	them.	By	way	
of	conclusion	 I	 illustrate	 this	 latter	position	 first	with	 respect	 to	 the	 institutional	and	 then	
with	the	participatory	sense	of	competition.	
Are	the	following	claims	intelligible?	
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1. We	took	advice	from	experienced	people,	studied	examples,	and	worked	seriously	to	
construct	 rules	 for	 our	 cycling	 competition.	 We	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 judge’s	
decision	would	 be	 final,	 and	 based	 entirely	 on	 the	 order	 competitors	 crossed	 the	
finishing	 line,	with	 the	winner	 to	 be	 awarded	 first	 prize,	 the	 second	over	 the	 line,	
second	prize,	 and	 so	on.	 Photographic	 evidence	would	be	 available	 if	 needed.	We	
were	sure	that	with	the	competition	being	decided	by	objective	criteria	alone	there	
would	 be	 few	 if	 any	 disputes	 about	 who	 had	 won,	 and	 we	 clarified	 that	 we	
recognised	 ties	 mighty	 occur.	 In	 the	 event,	 only	 one	 competitor	 signed	 up	 and	
entered	our	competition.	
	
	
Next,	with	respect	to	the	participatory	use	of	‘competition’:	
	
2. As	 instructed	 I	 entered	 my	 poem	 into	 the	 competition	 by	 post,	 not	 knowing	 the	
relative	 quality	 of	 other	 submissions.	 I	 had	 written	 the	 best	 I	 could,	 but	 had	 no	
confidence	that	I	could	write	better	than	other	people.	Two	weeks	later	I	received	a	
response	from	the	organisers	to	say	that	because	mine	was	the	only	entry	they	were	
unable	to	compare	my	poem	with	those	of	other	entrants;	unable	therefore	to	come	
to	 a	 conclusion	 about	 the	 relative	 quality	 of	my	poem	 compared	with	 that	 of	 any	
others;	but	that	because	I	met	all	the	competition	rules,	they	would	award	me	first	
prize.	
	
It	 is	 the	conclusion	 to	 this	article	 that	while	omitting	elements	 related	 respectively	 to	 the	
institutional	 and	 then	 to	 the	 participatory	 uses	 of	 competition,	 both	 examples	 are	 still	
intelligible.	
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Notes.	
	
1		Such	properties	have	been	attributed	to	‘competition’	for	some	time.	It	is	possible	to	discern	three	of	them	
in	 Coakley’s	 [1994:	 78]	 account	 that	 “competition	 is	 a	 process	 through	 which	 ‘winners’	 and	 ‘losers’	 are	
identified	and	all	people	are	ranked	hierarchically	on	the	basis	of	who	does	better	than	others	in	a	particular	
field.”	
2	 Although	 my	 discussion	 here	 is	 of	 participants	 acting	 competitively	 towards	 each	 other,	 I	 recognise	 that	
someone	 can	 be	 a	 participant	 in	 a	 competition	without	 having	 a	 competitive	motive,	 a	 distinction	 used	 by	
Kleinig	[1982:	164-165].	
3	 Readers	 of	 Kretchmar	 [2014]	will	 note	 that	 this	 is	 not	where	 he	 begins	 his	 discussion.	My	 reasons	 for	 so	
doing,	 however,	 should	 be	 clear	 by	 the	 end	 of	 this	 section.	 And	 oddly,	 after	 having	 discussed	 comparison,	
plurality	 and	 then	 normativity,	 he	 concludes	 [2014,	 35]	 that	 the	 latter	 “can	 be	 identified	 as	 a	 second	
cornerstone	of	competition.”	
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4	 Plurality	 is	 far	 from	an	unusual	 or	 new	 suggestion	 in	 respect	 of	 giving	 an	 account	 of	 competition.	 See	 for	
example	 Dearden’s	 three	 conditions	 [1972:	 120-121].	 However,	 such	 references	 to	 plurality	 need	 to	 be	
distinguished	from	that	of	Skultety	[2011].	
5		See	for	example,	in	addition	to	his	2014	article,	his	chapter	discussion	in	Morgan,	W.J.	[ed.]	[2007]	whose	
title	incorporates	reference	to	both	contests	and	competition	and	where	he	discusses	them	as	one	and	the	
same	entity.	I	cannot	locate	in	his	writings,	however,	a	defence	of	this	practice.	
6	 Kretchmar’s	 understanding	 of	 normativity	 given	 here	 differs	 from	 that	 of	 others	 who	 also	 highlight	
‘competition’	as	a	normative	concept.	See,	for	example,	Fielding:	133-134.	
7	This	is	similar	to	the	remark	made	by	Caillois	[1961:	15]	that	in	competitive	games,	for	the	competitor,	“the	
point	of	the	game	is	to	have	his	superiority	in	a	given	area	recognized.”	But	recall	Dunlop’s	[1975]	reply	to	the	
same	point	made	by	Bailey	[1975]:	“He	[Bailey]	seems	to	think	that	one	can	move	from	‘the	point	of	the	game	
is	 to	win	 it’	 to	 ‘the	only	 reason	why	people	play	games	 is	 to	show	their	 superiority	over	others	 in	 the	given	
area’.	This,	of	course,	is	a	quite	illegitimate	inference.”	
8	 But	 some	 claims	 appear	 to	 challenge	 this	 interpretation,	 e.g.	 “Winning,	 whatever	 else	 it	 may	 be,	 is	 a	
statement	of	superiority	and	dominance	over	others”	[Russell,	J.S.	2014:	240].	
9	My	 view	 is	 that	 the	 elements	 are	 linked	 in	 so	 far	 as	 a	 comparative	 evaluation	 depends	 upon	 comparison	
being	possible,	and	if	the	latter	is	by	and	of	competitors	in	competition,	there	must	be	at	least	two	of	them.	
Hence	the	third	element	[normativity]	depends	upon	the	second	[comparison],	and	the	second	upon	the	first	
[plurality].	 The	 fourth	 element,	 of	 disputation	 between	 competitors,	 all	 of	 whom	 maintain	 and	 want	 to	
demonstrate	 they	 are	 the	 best,	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 other	 three,	 but	 not	 in	 such	 a	 tight	 way.	 It	 is	 the	
competitors	who	make	claim	to	their	own	superiority	in	the	comparisons;	hence	the	connection.	But	while	the	
first	 three	 elements	 have	 conceptual	 connections	 [to	 each	 other:	 not	 to	 competition],	 whether	 and	 how	
competitors	evaluate	their	relative	strengths	is,	I	insist	and	am	about	to	discuss,	a	contingent	matter.	
10	It	is	surely	possible	to	regard	the	game	of	‘musical	chairs’	as	a	competition	without	attributing	any	merit	to	
its	performers	or	winner.	It	can	be	played	for	fun.	
11	Compare	this	with	Dearden’s	3rd	condition,	namely	that	those	 in	competition	who	know	that	their	gaining	
what	is	desired	would	exclude	the	other[s]	gaining	it,	nevertheless	persist	in	striving	to	do	so.	
12	I	remain	unclear	on	what	Kretchmar	understands	here	to	be	a	dispute.	I	consider	first	the	idea	that	it	is	open	
knowledge	between	 those	 in	 a	 competition	 that	 each	believes	 he	 is	 superior	 in	 the	 competitive	 event,	 and	
hence	disagrees	that	others	are	able	to	demonstrate	their	superiority	over	him.	
13	 Adopting	 an	 etymological	 approach,	 Dombrowski	 [2012,	 37]	 denies	 the	 disputation	 element	 altogether.	
Replacing	it	with	an	interrogative	one	he	says	“‘competition’	literally	means	‘to	ask	with’	one’s	opponent.	The	
competitors	are,	in	effect,	asking	each	other	the	question,	‘which	of	us	is	better	at	a	certain	activity?’”	
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